Introduction
The 'tyranny of the status quo' is commonly seen as an important block for tax reform. The tyranny of the status quo refers to the idea that government tax reforms will usually provoke a strong reaction from those that 'lose' from the reform but little support from those that 'win' from reform. This creates a bias where government is reluctant to reform taxes and so sticks to the status quo (Cameron and Muellbauer, 2000; Lyons, 2007; Mirrlees et al., 2011a; 2011b; Johnson and Myles, 2011) .
A striking example of this tyranny of the status quo is the general failure to reform Council Tax (CT) in the UK. CT is the main tax on property in the UK. Properties are placed in one of eight CT bands depending on the price of the property relative to other properties. Band A is the lowest value property band and band H is the highest value property value band. CT bills are expressed as ratios of the band D CT bill. The ratios are expressed in 9ths, which means as a fraction of nine. The bill for a band H property is 18/9 (or double) the band D bill. The bill for band A property is 6/9 the band D bill. This means that the CT bill for band H is triple the CT bill for band A. CT bills also reflect charges for local government services such as rubbish collection and so is a hybrid tax combining a tax on property with charges for local services (Jones et al., 2006a; 2006b; Lyons, 2007) . There is a 25% CT bill reduction for sole occupiers and income support through Council Tax Benefit is made available for low income groups (Adam and Browne, 2012) .
A common idea is to revalue CT to reflect large changes in property prices since CT was first introduced (Kenway and Palmer, 1999; Plimmer, 1999; Muellbauer and Cameron, 2000; Jones et al., 2006a; 2006b; Lyons, 2007; Mirrlees et al., 2011a; 2011a; European Commission, 2014) . The tyranny of the status quo seems a key block for reforming CT. Mirrlees et al (2011a) note that: 'any revaluation inevitably creates losers and winners-and losers tend to be very vocal. This is one of the most egregious demonstrations of the 'tyranny of the status quo' as a block to desirable change' (Mirrlees et al., 2011a, p. 383 ).
An important exception to the tyranny of the status quo is the Welsh government revaluation of CT in 2005. Since devolution, UK government CT policy only applies to England and Wales. The Scottish Parliament has the remit for local government finance and Northern Ireland has its own system of domestic rates that differ from CT. Up to 2011, the Welsh government was dependent upon the UK government for enabling legislation for CT reform in Wales (National Assembly for Wales, 2011 This paper is organised as follows. The first part outlines the background to CT. The second section considers the role of the tyranny of the status quo as a block to reform. The third and fourth parts outline the case study method and considers the Welsh government revaluation of CT in 2005. This is followed by a discussion and conclusion.
Background
The failure of the Community Charge or 'Poll Tax' provides the immediate background to the introduction of CT in the early 1990s. During the 1980s, there was a system of domestic rates for UK households which were based on the value of property. Although the rates were well understood and fairly easy to collect, the Conservative government was critical of the rates because they did not take account of the number of people in a household. This meant that sole householders in an expensive property might pay larger rates than a many person household in a cheaper property. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher saw this as unfair and wanted to replace the rates with a tax on persons. The Poll Tax led to mass avoidance and public riots in London. The failure of the Poll Tax has been described as one of the largest policy blunders by UK government since the end of the Second World War and was a key factor in the deposal of Thatcher as Conservative leader (Butler et al., 1994; King and Crewe, 2014) CT was introduced as the replacement for the Poll Tax. The aim was not to return to the rates and so the CT was based on relative property prices. Repeated calls have been made for the reform of CT (Kenway and Palmer, 1999; Plimmer, 1999; Muellbauer and Cameron, 2000; Jones et al., 2006a; 2006b; Lyons, 2007; Mirrlees et al., 2011a; 2011b; European Commission, 2014) . Sir James Mirrlees chaired a recent review of the principles that should shape the design of tax systems in the 21 st century. This review argues that tax systems should be both progressive and neutral. Progressivity means that richer people should pay a higher proportion of their income or wealth than poorer people on taxation. This springs from a commitment to equality as well as a belief that richer people have a greater capacity to pay higher taxes than poorer people. Neutrality means that similar economic activities should be taxed similarly. Neutrality is aimed at ensuring an efficient tax system.
Although Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) outline general tax reforms, this review illustrates their ideas by proposing reforms of UK taxation. Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) argue that housing should ideally be taxed as a consumption good. This is because housing provides a range of services that people consume (such as shelter or warmth). Mirrlees et al. (2011a) propose a Housing Services Tax (HST) to tax housing as a consumption good. They say that HST should ideally be set at the same rate as general consumption tax in the UK (that is, Value Added Tax (VAT)). HST would replace CT and other taxes on property in the UK. Mirrlees et al (2011a) propose that the HST would be a flat-rate percentage imposed on the rental value of the property (this would cover both rented and owner-occupied properties). Mirrlees et al. (2011a) estimate that the HST would then be about 12% on the value of housing services. They say that this rate was below the (then) level of VAT of 17.5%, but there may be scope for increasing the HST over time to approach the VAT rate. Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) acknowledge that reforming existing taxes is more likely than the implementation of HST. Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) note that CT is highly regressive over property values and so violates their progressivity principle. In England, the threshold value for a band H property is £320,000. The upper limit for a band A property is £40,000.
Thus, the CT bill for a band H property is triple the value for a band A property although the value for a band H property is at least eight times the value of a band A property. CT is also based on property prices that are over 20 years out of date. There have been large relative house price changes and so current CT bands are out of date. Lyons (2007) notes that while revaluation might reduce regressivity over property values, this might not have much impact of regressivity over income (before income support through Council Tax Benefit is applied). This is because there are a class of 'asset rich, income poor' people who have lower incomes but live in higher value properties. Lyons (2007) notes that these 'asset rich, income poor' people often include pensioners and form a minority of households. Lyons (2007) adds that the presence of such people does not undermine the case for revaluation but highlights that the overall effect of revaluation on regressivity is ambiguous. Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) adds that CT is inefficient. The 25% discount in CT bills for sole occupiers provides incentives for the inefficient use of the existing housing stock by encouraging sole rather than multiple occupancy. Lack of regular revaluations might also contribute to instability in the housing market. Without regular revaluations, CT bills as a share of property values fall faster in areas in high property price growth than low property price growth. This would then mean that CT would not dampen property price booms (Muellbauer and Cameron, 2000; Jones et al. 2006a; 2006b) . Jones et al. (2006a; 2006b) simulate the likely effects of a CT revaluation on local government finances and the movement of properties between bands. They base their research on data from Scottish local authorities. Jones et al. (2006a; 2006b) argue that CT revaluation could have significant impact on local government finances and the movement of properties between bands. This is because CT bands focus on relative property values rather than being based on the capital value of a house. Jones et al. (2006a; 2006b) conclude that CT revaluation would be more than 'rearranging the deckchairs'.
The tyranny of the status quo
The tyranny of the status quo claims that politicians can expect little thanks from the winners from tax reform but a strong backlash from those that lose out. Winners and losers can be understood though in different ways. Winners might be seen as those people that make a financial gain from a tax change. However, the financial gain might be understood to be the gain that arises from a specific tax change or from the wider impact that a particular tax change triggers for the whole tax system (for example, a tax rise might allow other taxes to be streamlined or cut) (Kaplow, 2011) . Alternatively, winning might be associated with the way that tax reforms advance certain values. For example, a person might back a rise in the rate of income tax even though they are made financially worse off because this leads to a more progressive tax system that they support. This discussion is important because it means that government may have a role in shaping how winners and losers from tax reform are understood in public debates.
The complexity of picking winners and losers may be seen by considering CT revaluation. If revaluation occurs, then an obvious set of winners and losers may be those properties that, respectively, drop down or rise up the CT bands. However, winners might also include properties that stay in the same band. The band that a particular property is placed in after revaluation depends on any changes in the property price relative to other property price changes. A property may stay in the same CT band if its property price rise is less than the rises elsewhere. If the revaluation is not aimed at raising more revenue overall, then the CT bill for a property that remains in the same band depends on the number of other properties that have changed bands. For example, a case where 50% of properties stay in the same band but 25% of properties drop down a band and 25% of properties rise up a band mean that the CT bill may be unchanged for a property that stays in the same band. However, the CT bill for a property that stays in the same band may rise if 5% of properties rise up a band, 50% of properties stay in the same band and 45% of properties drop down a band.
A failure to revalue also creates winners and losers. This is because CT bill for properties which experience above average rises in value are lower than they would be after revaluation.
Properties with little or no rise in property values are in effect subsidising the CT bills of properties with high rises (Lyons, 2007; Mirrlees et al., 2011a; 2011b) . recommendations in the methods literature, the codes were first tested on an initial set of documents and the codes were then revised (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2000; Popay et al., 2007) .
Methods

The 2005 CT revaluation in Wales
The would improve the progressive nature of CT, the Welsh government anticipated that this move would mean higher CT bills for many people and so create many losers from reform.
The Welsh government was concerned with avoiding this and so ruled out a move to 8ths. A revalued set of CT bands were set out in the first consultation. There would be a new band I.
The bands were set at 50% of the difference between the average sale values. However, the Tables 1 and 2 below show the effects of the 2005 revaluation on the numbers of properties in the different bands. Table 1 reports the CT bands before and after the revaluation and Table 2 shows the numbers of properties in Wales in the different CT bands before and after the revaluation. The second column of Table 2 shows the number of properties in each band after the inflows and outflows of properties following revaluation. The inflows (and outflows) are made up of properties that have either risen or fallen from other bands. The mix of inflows and outflows differs for different bands.
Effects of the 2005 revaluation
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 
Reaction to the 2005 revaluation
This gap between expectations and reality mattered because it shaped the public and political reaction to the 2005 revaluation. Debates about revaluation were dominated by focusing on properties that moved bands and this had an effect on a further revaluation for Wales in 2015.
Nick Bourne the leader of the Conservatives in the Welsh Assembly stated that: 'Less than one in 10 households will benefit from going down a council tax band whereas more than a third will go up at least one band ' (reported in BBC News, 2005) . The Chair of the WLGA Alex Alridge voiced similar concerns about the proportions of households moving up at least one band (Parry, 2005) . Media coverage also described households that moved up bands as losers from reform. There was little discussion of those people who were possible winners either by dropping down bands or staying in the same band (Niffield, 2005; Isaacs, 2005; Western Mail, 2005) .
The Welsh government responded to the worries over the revaluation by running a consultation in 2004 on a transitional relief scheme aimed at protecting households that moved up bands following the revaluation (Welsh government, 2004c) . Following this consultation, a transitional relief scheme was implemented which meant that no household could move up more than one band a year (Parry, 2005 (Essex, 2004) . Welsh government (2005a) records that the transitional relief scheme would run for three years.
Failed CT revaluation in 2015
The skewed nature of public debates over the CT revaluation was important as this seemed 
Discussion
This paper suggests that the tyranny of the status quo is not a fixed constraint on government trying to reform taxes. This paper claims that government can create space for tax reform by framing how the winners and losers from reform are understood.
What does the Welsh government revaluation of CT show about this claim? During the revaluation process, the Welsh government paid attention to the winners and losers from reform. The Welsh government ruled out a shift from 9ths to 8ths that would have improved the progressivity of CT as this would have increased the losers from reform. Its transitional relief scheme was also aimed at cushioning the impact on the CT bills of properties that rose bands.
Nevertheless, a major limitation is that the Welsh government did not convey the complexity of reform adequately. The Welsh government devoted little attention to explaining or informing the public how the winners from revaluation might also include properties that stayed in the same band after revaluation. Nearly three fifths of properties stayed in the same band after revaluation. Those properties that stayed in the same band might also be seen as winners. This is because their CT bills were arguably lower than they would have been with no revaluation.
The failure to communicate the complexity of reform meant that the Welsh government was put on the defensive in debates after the revaluation. Debates focused on the mismatch between the expectations and reality of those properties that moved between bands after the revaluation. It was easy for critics to portray the CT revaluation as a failed exercise. These worries were not confined to the critics of reform but also to its erstwhile supporters. The WLGA was one of the key backers of reform of CT and was involved in the reform process by taking part in the CTRWG. However, the WLGA voiced concern over the impact of revaluation on the movement of properties between bands. This skewed debates about CT reform in 2015.
Perhaps the main lesson from the Welsh CT revaluation in 2005 is that government should take an active role in shaping how the winners and losers from reform are understood. Part of this may focus on highlighting the complexity of tax reform typically involves a varied set of winners and losers. Doing this might help rebut the arguments of critics that seek to present winners and losers in a particular way. Government might also place more weight in developing arguments that challenge the framework of the tyranny of the status quo as well as highlighting the complexities involved in using such a framework. The Welsh government did refer to arguments about fairness when outlining the case for reform in 2005. However, these arguments were dominated by a concern the Welsh government had with minimising the losers from reform.
Conclusion
A general reluctance by government to make the case for reform is perhaps one of the reasons why CT has been unreformed for so long. The Welsh government revaluation in 2005 is an exception to this trend. Yet, while the Welsh government engaged with a calculus of winners and losers during the policy process it did not communicate the complexity of reform enough to the public. Admittedly, explaining that winners might include those properties that remain in the same band after reform might be a harder task than focusing simply on properties that drop bands. However, tax reform is often complex and so public communication means government engaging with complex arguments. The failure of the Welsh government to embark on this task hampered the 2015 CT revaluation. The fact that the Welsh government managed to revalue CT in 2005 shows that reform is possible. The task now for government to reform CT is to engage with the public more thoroughly on the complexity of tax reform. 
